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DEBATE 
CONSUMER-DIRECTED HEALTH CARE 
You won’t hear many health experts claim that the American 
healthcare system is functioning perfectly in terms of core considera-
tions such as cost, access, and quality.  The question that arises with 
the advent of any new policy approach seeking to improve the system 
is obvious:  Does the change represent a step forward or backward?  
Professors Kristin Madison, of Penn, and Peter Jacobson, of the Uni-
versity of Michigan, take up this question in regard to the latest inno-
vation in health care policy—consumer-directed healthcare (CDHC).   
Professor Madison argues that while CDHC is not a panacea, 
“[e]ven if its shortcomings prevent its full diffusion through the 
American health care system, CDHC will still . . . help[] to establish a 
foundation for future reforms in health care finance and delivery, 
[and] has the potential to improve the health care system in the long 
run.”  Professor Jacobson’s response?  “CDHC is a direct attack on the 
idea that health care differs from other market commodities because 
of its moral aspirations . . . .  For those who believe that equity should 
be a fundamental attribute of health care delivery, CDHC represents a 
huge step backwards.”  Nonetheless, Professor Madison is convinced 
that CDHC will be a lightning rod that stirs the American health care 
system out of its complacency and “forces us to confront the tradeoffs 
inherent in any health care system in a resource-constrained world.”  
Professor Jacobson is not content to wait and see how the American 
public reacts to CDHC:  “If the policy focus is on CDHC, equity will be 
subordinated.  If universal coverage dominates, CDHC proponents 
are probably right that cost and quality issues will be subordinate.  For 
me, it’s an easy choice—helping those without insurance to have a 
minimal acceptable level of care.”     
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Consumer-directed health care (CDHC) has become a common 
topic of conversation among those interested in health care law and 
policy issues.  Definitions of CDHC vary, but they share a common 
core:  the notion of increasing consumers’ control over their own 
health care.  Consumer-directed care can be contrasted with care di-
rected by physicians or others who deliver health care services, on the 
one hand, or employers and insurers who finance and manage pay-
ment for services, on the other.  The term CDHC de-emphasizes the 
role these third parties play in the health care decision-making proc-
ess, reinforcing instead the parallels between the purchase of health 
care and the purchase of everyday consumer goods and services.  Con-
sumers ordinarily exercise full decision-making power with respect to 
their purchases outside of the health care context and bear the full 
financial burden of their decisions; in a CDHC setting, enrollee-
patients ordinarily exercise some decision-making power over their 
care and bear at least some of the associated financial burden. 
Practically speaking, CDHC is often implemented through a com-
bination of a high-deductible health plan (“HDHP”), such as a plan 
under which an individual must pay for the first $2,000 of care re-
ceived, and a tax-favored, portable health savings account (“HSA”), in 
which individuals or their employers deposit funds that the individuals 
can direct toward purchasing medical care.  According to the Amer-
ica’s Health Insurance Plans Center for Policy and Research, by Janu-
ary 2007, enrollment in HDHP/HSA products exceeded 4.5 million 
individuals.  While the HDHP/HSA combination is only one possible 
form of CDHC, it is the most widely recognized form. 
CDHC’s structural characteristics and rapid growth have 
prompted much discussion about its effects.  One major advantage of 
CDHC (beyond the greater amount of choice it offers participants) is 
the likelihood that it will increase some patients’ sensitivity to health 
care costs, decreasing demand for low-value services and possibly 
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spurring greater levels of competition, which may in turn reduce 
health care expenditures.  If quality joins cost as a criterion patients 
use in choosing health care providers and services, CDHC may lead to 
higher health care quality.  In addition, by increasing the likelihood 
that individuals will bear some of the financial costs of treatment ne-
cessitated by unhealthy behaviors, CDHC may encourage healthier 
lifestyles.  Drawbacks of CDHC include the high burden it imposes on 
those who lack the information, education, mental or physical ability, 
emotional capacity, or financial wherewithal necessary to make good 
choices about their care.  Bad choices can produce both worse health 
outcomes and higher costs than would result under more conven-
tional health plans.  CDHC critics also highlight concerns about its ef-
fect on insurance pools: if HDHP/HSA plans attract healthy individu-
als looking for tax-favored savings vehicles, they may leave sicker 
enrollees in traditional plans, raising plan premiums and forcing the 
sickest to shoulder a higher proportion of their own costs. 
Evidence of these effects is just beginning to emerge, and contin-
ued collection and evaluation of this evidence is essential to assessing 
CDHC’s desirability.  Perhaps the most important long-term implica-
tions of CDHC stem not from its direct effects, however, but instead 
from its indirect influences on health care finance and delivery.  Even 
if its shortcomings prevent its full diffusion through the American 
health care system, CDHC will still constitute a step forward for health 
care policy in the United States.  By helping to establish a foundation 
for future reforms in health care finance and delivery, it has the po-
tential to improve the health care system in the long run. 
 
CDHC’s Long-Run Effects 
 
CDHC’s first potential long-run effect is to change the way that 
people think about health care and health care coverage.  Once fully 
insured, individuals have reason to seek out any care they expect to 
benefit their health, regardless of the care’s cost; insurance insulates 
them from the cost of care.  By contrast, an HDHP enrollee may have 
to pay the full cost of his or her care.  Besides providing incentives to 
consider whether care is necessary and to find low-cost sources of care, 
the payment obligation reminds enrollees that care is not free and in 
fact costs considerably more than the $20 copayment or the 20% coin-
surance rate that an enrollee in a more traditional plan might pay.  
Every time a patient dips into an HSA, the account balance drops, 
emphasizing the connection between the choices patients make and 
their financial consequences. 
110 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 156: 107 
PENNumbra 
In the long run, these CDHC features may change people’s atti-
tudes.  Mark Hall and Clark Havighurst have pointed to a number of 
possible changes:  the need to set aside funds for purchasing services 
may undermine the entitlement mentality that many people have with 
respect to health care; patients’ increased involvement in decision 
making sensitizes them to the tradeoffs inherent in medical care and 
may help them understand the need for limitations on insurance cov-
erage; and the clearly differentiated roles for health plans, patients, 
and others under CDHC may increase recognition of the distinction 
between treatment decisions and decisions to finance care. 
A second potential legacy of CDHC is the development of tools 
useful for addressing concerns about health care costs and quality.  As 
CDHC critics point out, CDHC cannot realize many of its potential 
benefits if information about health care prices and quality is lacking.  
Without information about the care that they are considering, HDHP 
enrollees cannot make health care decisions that accurately reflect 
their underlying preferences, and competition based on price or qual-
ity is unlikely to develop. 
While historically this information has indeed been lacking, the 
spread of HDHPs and HSAs has increased enrollee and employer de-
mand for it.  Insurers offering CDHC-oriented products have begun 
to fulfill this demand by disseminating physician-specific price and 
quality information.  Moreover, in an effort to support consumer 
choice and expand value-driven health care, the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services has promoted greater transparency in 
prices and quality, and Medicare has begun to disclose some informa-
tion about payments to physicians and others.  Numerous states have 
joined the transparency campaign as well, requiring the disclosure of 
certain types of health care quality and cost- or price-related informa-
tion.  While declining costs of compiling information, increasing con-
cern about quality deficiencies, and other factors have undoubtedly 
contributed to this recent disclosure trend, the desire to facilitate con-
sumer involvement in health care decision making appears to be a 
major driving force behind it. 
A third potential effect of CDHC’s rise is further development of 
the legal framework within which CDHC functions.  Peter Jacobson 
and Michael Tunick argue that in a CDHC setting, courts will be more 
likely to consider resource constraints in defining medical standards 
of care, which would reduce the likelihood of provider liability in 
cases where cost-conscious patients choose a course of care that in-
jures them.  Mark Hall suggests that courts’ interpretations of the in-
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surance contract term “medical necessity” will change as CDHC 
growth prompts professional practice to become more cost-sensitive.  
E. Haavi Morreim notes that CDHC growth may increase litigation 
against health plans for providing poor-quality information about 
health care prices or treatment quality that leads to patient decisions 
with negative consequences.  Regulations guiding information provi-
sion may also accompany CDHC’s spread. 
Most obviously, these CDHC-associated developments matter for 
CDHC’s future success.  If consumer attitudes fail to change, price 
and quality tools fail to mature, or the law fails to address CDHC-
related issues, then CDHC may disappear as a result of consumer re-
sistance and CDHC’s failure to realize hoped-for benefits.  But these 
developments also matter because they will shape the next set of ap-
proaches we adopt to confront problems of health care cost, quality, 
and access—even if these approaches depart from the pure 
HDHP/HSA form of CDHC. 
 
CDHC’s Potential Role in Shaping Our Future Health Care System 
 
CDHC may influence the future health care system by facilitating 
the development of other approaches to financing and delivering 
care.  Hall and Havighurst point out, for example, that HSAs may lay 
the foundation for revitalizing managed care.  The cause of managed 
care’s decline was multifactorial, but included the public’s and courts’ 
resistance to the constraints it imposed on access to care recom-
mended by physicians.  Hall and Havighurst argue, however, that 
HSAs will encourage the public and the legal system to recognize as 
legitimate the constraints established by well-run health plans.  If 
HSAs change consumer attitudes so that consumers are more recep-
tive to limitations on financing care, consumers may become more in-
terested in managed care products that can assist them in making the 
necessary tradeoffs.  If the legal system similarly supports such limita-
tions, managed care will become more viable in the long run. 
The trend toward quality disclosure may also increase consumer 
receptivity to managed care coverage limits.  Consumers might be 
more likely to accept limited provider networks, for example, if they 
knew that the included providers were of high quality, or that ex-
cluded providers were excluded on the basis of low quality or low effi-
ciency.  If regulators and courts help to ensure that quality ratings are 
meaningful and accurate, consumers could use the ratings in selecting 
managed care plans, choosing providers, or deciding when to seek 
treatment outside of their plans. 
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CDHC could also lay the foundation for more dramatic changes, 
such as the adoption of a single-payer system.  If HDHP/HSA enroll-
ment expands to include many people who do not want the decision-
making and financial responsibilities that these plans entail, a CDHC 
backlash rivaling the managed care backlash may ultimately develop.  
If the backlash does not lead to a more robust managed-care-based 
health care system, it may generate support for a single-payer system 
in which core coverage decisions are made by government organiza-
tions.  If CDHC increases the public’s recognition that medical care is 
costly and that tradeoffs are inevitable, for example, the public may 
become more interested in public financial support for core coverage 
and more willing to accept the benefit limits likely to be inherent in a 
single-payer system.  CDHC’s consumerist orientation may persist in 
the form of individuals’ decisions to seek care outside of public pro-
grams. 
Perhaps the most likely legacy of the rise of CDHC, however, is a 
pluralist approach to health care finance and delivery, accompanied 
by an increased focus on variations in costs and quality.  Some people 
will take advantage of the flexibility that the HDHP/HSA combination 
offers, while others may turn to less intense forms of CDHC or more 
heavily managed insurance products.  The choices made by individu-
als in CDHC plans will help us understand the sorts of tradeoffs indi-
viduals are willing to make, potentially helping not only to refine 
CDHC designs, but also to shape other kinds of insurance coverage.  
Building a framework for disseminating information about health 
care prices could help not only HDHP/HSA participants, but also the 
uninsured and anyone else financing their own care, particularly if 
CDHC promotes price competition.  Developing and disseminating 
information about quality will facilitate decision making by CDHC 
participants, other privately insured individuals, the publicly insured, 
and the uninsured, as well as those putting together insurance net-
works; it can also assist providers seeking to improve their own quality.  
In short, even if CDHC fails to fully diffuse through the health care 
system, it is a step forward for health care policy in the long run. 
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REBUTTAL 
Consumer-Directed Health Care (CDHC)—Not the Next Best Thing Since 
Sliced Bread (Or, Why Is This Fad Different from All Other  
Health Policy Fads?) 
Peter D. Jacobson
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At the end of a recent presentation on how I expect the courts to 
rule in challenges to consumer-directed health care (CDHC) prod-
ucts, a member of the audience asked plaintively whether anyone here 
opposes CDHC.  I responded that I had been invited to provide a le-
gal analysis, but if I had been asked my opinion, I would have simply 
said, “I come not to praise CDHC but to bury it.” 
After reading Professor Madison’s thoughtful arguments favoring 
the concept, I’m tempted to say that CDHC offers a potentially advan-
tageous innovation to resolve the nation’s dysfunctional health system.  
But as one of Steve Martin’s Saturday Night Live characters would have 
said, “Nah!”  Despite Professor Madison’s compelling arguments, 
CDHC will not be the panacea its proponents maintain and is likely to 
exacerbate the very problems vexing the health care system. 
Professor Madison asks a sensible question:  Is CDHC a step for-
ward or a step backward?  With some important caveats, she answers 
in the affirmative.  To support her conclusion, Professor Madison 
makes two broad points.  First, CDHC offers considerable advantages 
on its own terms.  Second, even if it does not meet expectations, 
CDHC’s innovations will positively change how we think about health 
care reforms. 
With one very strong exception, my answer is negative—CDHC is 
decidedly a step in the wrong direction.  Before addressing my excep-
tion to that answer, let me raise two other questions.  First, why is 
CDHC different from any other health policy fad?  Answer—it’s not.  
And second, is CDHC likely to achieve the spectacular advances its 
proponents predict?  Answer—not very likely.  At this point, any ad-
vantages must be presumed—there is no empirical evidence support-
ing CDHC’s benefits.  Nonetheless, I agree that the failure of CDHC 
will compel new thinking about health care reforms, but with a some-
what different prospect than Professor Madison’s. 
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The core policy question regarding CDHC remains what it has 
been in all post-World War II health policy debates.  In a country that 
values individualism and markets and largely distrusts government, 
what is the proper balance between governmental intervention and 
reliance on markets to provide health care?  Is health care different 
from other market goods and services?  Do we care? 
 
CDHC: Advantages and Deficiencies 
 
Advantages.  The core components of CDHC are high-deductible 
health plans (HDHPs), usually paired with tax-favored health savings 
accounts (HSAs).  Whatever the exact combination chosen, the essen-
tial feature is to shift the risk away from the employer or health in-
surer to the individual patient.  Essentially, CDHC is the latest varia-
tion on a theme of a market-oriented health care system.  Shifting the 
risk of health care choices to patients has the potential to fundamen-
tally transform health care into a market commodity and to change 
the nature of what differentiates health care from other goods and 
services. 
Professor Madison very capably outlines the case for CDHC.  Its 
proponents argue, more on faith than on empirical evidence, that a 
market-driven system will result in lower costs and increased quality of 
care.  In turn, this will lead to lower numbers of uninsured patients.  
In contrast to the health care delivery models that preceded CDHC, 
first fee-for-service and then managed care, patients will take increas-
ing responsibility for what treatment to seek and how much treatment 
to receive.  Whether CDHC will benefit or harm individual enrollees is 
an empirical question that has not yet been answered. 
Deficiencies.  Without dwelling on CDHC’s limitations, it is worth 
mentioning that at a time when many observers argue that the system 
should emphasize prevention, CDHC is likely to encourage patient 
underinvestment in prevention.  Equally important, far more than in 
either the fee-for-service or managed care eras, CDHC is premised on 
patients’ ability to obtain adequate information.  The information 
asymmetries that have constrained the shift to a market-based health 
care system in the past are magnified in CDHC. 
For CDHC to achieve its anticipated objectives, providing patients 
with adequate cost and quality information is essential.  If patients are 
expected to make choices about the value of various treatment op-
tions relative to costs, including choosing high-quality providers and 
facilities, the burden rests with institutions providing and controlling 
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the flow of data to demonstrate transparency—showing that the in-
formation is complete, accurate, and up-to-date.  As many observers 
including industry insiders have noted, proponents vastly underesti-
mate the challenges of providing information in a form that the aver-
age patient can absorb.  At this point, the promise of transparency ex-
ceeds its reality. 
On these issues, Professor Madison and I seem to have some 
agreement.  Where I disagree is her characterization of CDHC’s po-
tential legacy.  Many of the innovations she describes, such as trans-
parency on price and quality data, predate CDHC and are needed 
improvements regardless of how the system is organized and financed. 
 
Health Care as a Commodity 
 
But CDHC’s potential deficiencies are secondary to my opposi-
tion.  What proponents see as CDHC’s primary attribute, transforming 
health care into just another market commodity, is what concerns me 
most.  Bringing market discipline to health care delivery is fine.  Yet 
there is a big difference between introducing value into the system 
and shifting altogether to a market commodity.  Even accepting that 
some of the proponents’ claims are likely to be valid, it is important to 
recognize and weigh what will be lost in the transition, particularly the 
attendant distributional consequences. 
Dan Brock and Norman Daniels, in Ethical Foundations of the Clin-
ton Administration’s Proposed Health Care System, 271 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
1189 (1994), have argued that health care is of fundamental moral 
importance in protecting the opportunity to pursue life goals, reduc-
ing pain and suffering, and preventing premature loss of life.  Brock 
and Daniels further argue that health care is a fundamental good.  As 
such, moral ideals of justice, equality, and community require that the 
health care system be universal, comprehensive, and equitable in shar-
ing its benefits and costs. 
Thus, CDHC implicates the larger philosophical question that 
needs to be addressed regarding societal values.  CDHC is a direct at-
tack on the idea that health care differs from other market commodi-
ties because of its moral aspirations, including a special concern for 
an equitable health care delivery system.  For those who believe that 
equity should be a fundamental attribute of health care delivery, 
CDHC represents a huge step backwards.  By its very nature, a CDHC-
based system will be less concerned about equity and will most likely 
exacerbate existing disparities in access to health care and clinical 
outcomes. 
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This is not to suggest that health care must be egalitarian—
providing everyone with access to the same level of care based solely 
on medical need.  Nonetheless, health care is a public good that 
should not be wholly subjected to the caprices of the market.  Indeed, 
much of the current policy debate is sadly reminiscent of the objec-
tions to enacting Medicare and Medicaid in the 1960s.  For all of 
those programs’ deficiencies, would the elderly and low-income peo-
ple covered be better served had they not been enacted?  The market 
failed the Medicare and Medicaid populations before and there’s no 
reason to believe that the results will be different this time around. 
To be sure, market competition is generally good at reducing 
costs and improving quality.  To that extent, the ongoing changes in 
health care that Professor Madison discusses are positive develop-
ments and should be encouraged.  Where market competition is 
unlikely to help is in providing access to health care for uninsured 
and underinsured populations.  At best, CDHC can only address dis-
crete aspects of what ails health care delivery. 
For those who believe that excessive costs and poor quality are the 
most glaring health care failures, CDHC could be a viable option.  But 
the argument that reducing costs will lead to increased access lacks 
any plausibility.  I can’t think of any area of social policy where the 
market losers have been aided by even the most well-functioning mar-
kets absent governmental intervention. 
Now we get to the exception that I mentioned at the beginning 
regarding my opposition to CDHC.  Professor Madison observes that a 
backlash to CDHC, similar to the managed care backlash, could lead 
to public support for a single-payer system.  A serious backlash to 
CDHC may be the best way to achieve some form of universal health 
care, which I favor.  As a result, part of me wants to adopt CDHC be-
cause doing so will simply hasten the enactment of some form of uni-
versal health care or single-payer system.  After the experiment with 
CDHC fails, as it inevitably will, the only reasonable alternative will lie 
with greater governmental involvement.  Once the market solution is 
exposed, there will be no more excuses and no justification for further 
delaying universal health care.  To that extent, CDHC may be the 
necessary precursor to a more equitable health care delivery system. 
As a practical matter, I doubt that the public is ready for the inevi-
table analogies to used car salesmen.  Caveat emptor, a reality of a func-
tioning market, does not strike me as a very effective marketing cam-
paign for health systems.  In fact, the slow acceptance of CDHC 
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among employers and employees alike suggests the limits to a purely 
market-based approach. 
 
Health Policy Fads 
 
Health care is a field driven by fads.  Repeatedly, health policy 
proves the wisdom of H. L. Mencken’s famous aphorism that “there is 
always a well-known solution to every human problem—neat, plausi-
ble, and wrong.”  If there’s a field of domestic policy that is more sub-
ject to the fad-of-the-month than health care, it eludes me.  CDHC is 
the current fad of the day.  Before the current fascination with 
CDHCs as the panacea for the health care mess, we heard the same 
claims for the following magic potions: 
• Managed competition 
• Managed care 
• Health insurance purchasing cooperatives 
• Business health purchasing coalitions 
• Medical liability reform 
• State health reforms 
In its time, each of these policy innovations was heralded as the 
solution to the cost, quality, and access concerns facing the health 
care non-system.  Needless to say, each one of these failed miserably as 
the solution.  Despite this woeful litany of failures, CDHC proponents 
still maintain that this innovation will be different.  It reminds me of 
the old adage that second marriages represent the triumph of hope 
over experience.  For what other than unbridled faith in markets can 
explain proponents’ irrational exuberance favoring CDHC? 
Or, to put it differently, why is this fad different from all other 
health policy fads?  Much like the previous fads, CDHC will be ex-
posed as flawed and then another fad will emerge, unless the public 
demands the inevitable universal health care coverage.  Until then, 
not only is CDHC the wrong approach to solving the problems at the 
core of our broken health care non-system, but its widespread adop-
tion will actually exacerbate existing inequities. 
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CLOSING ARGUMENT 
Kristin Madison 
In taking the position that CDHC is a step in the wrong direction, 
Professor Jacobson argues that CDHC will lead to underinvestment in 
preventive services, that innovations in the dissemination of price and 
quality data predate CDHC, that CDHC undermines the equity that 
should be a fundamental attribute of health care delivery, and that 
CDHC is just another in a string of flawed health policy fads and is 
“the wrong approach to solving the problems at the core of our bro-
ken health care non-system.” 
As it turns out, Professor Jacobson and I agree on a lot of things. 
We agree that CDHC raises concerns about preventive services, 
that information dissemination is an important policy issue even out-
side of the CHDC context, and that CDHC could undermine equity.  
We even agree that CDHC is a flawed health policy initiative that can-
not itself solve the problems of our health care non-system. 
And yet we still disagree about the answer to the question at the 
core of our debate:  Is CDHC a step forward?  Despite Professor Jacob-
son’s insightful arguments, I still think it is. 
Why the difference in conclusions, despite our areas of agree-
ment?  One explanation is that I believe that CDHC’s flaws need not 
be fatal.  For example, while it is true that CDHC can encourage pa-
tient underinvestment in prevention—enrollees may choose not to 
seek cost-effective preventive care, either because they cannot afford it 
or because they do not understand the health consequences of their 
decisions—some CDHC-oriented plans try to address this problem by 
offering first-dollar coverage of the costs of certain types of care.  Fur-
thermore, while it is true that providing the information critical to the 
effective functioning of CDHC is a challenge, we have made consider-
able progress in this area in just the past few years. 
Another, more significant contributor to our divergent conclu-
sions is our differing views of the implications of CDHC’s potential 
status as a health policy fad.  Like Professor Jacobson, I doubt that the 
HDHP/HSA in its current form will ever become the predominant 
approach to financing health care.  The burdens it imposes on enrol-
lees are just too big for it to be accepted by the population as a whole.  
But even if it does fade into the background, replaced by another pol-
icy fad, it can have a lasting legacy.  Managed care may have “failed 
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miserably” “as the solution to the cost, quality, and access concerns 
faced by the health care non-system,” but it did advance the develop-
ment of cost containment techniques (such as utilization review) still 
in use for some health care services today.  It also made clear enrol-
lees’ preferences for a broader choice of providers, preferences that 
the CDHC approach was in part developed to accommodate. 
Like managed care, CDHC could have lasting effects, even if it is 
eventually displaced by another fad.  As I argued in my opening 
statement, CDHC may benefit policy in the long run by changing atti-
tudes, helping to develop legal tools, and promoting the development 
and dissemination of health care price and quality information.  With 
respect to this last benefit, I agree with Professor Jacobson that the ini-
tial creation and publication of quality measures predated the rise of 
CDHC.  However, CDHC analysts and advocates recognize that if it or 
indeed any market-based approach is to take full advantage of the 
benefits that markets can offer, information problems must be ad-
dressed.  Their voices have joined those who support information dis-
semination as a mechanism for improving quality, in an effort to ad-
vance the development of techniques for assessing and reporting 
quality.  As Professor Jacobson recognizes, price and quality transpar-
ency are beneficial features of a health care system, regardless of the 
form that the system ultimately takes.  In short, even if it is a fad, 
CDHC could constitute a step forward. 
Perhaps the most important explanation for our disagreement, 
however, is our differing views of the role that equity concerns should 
play in determining whether CDHC constitutes a step forward.  Pro-
fessor Jacobson is concerned that CDHC will “transform[] health care 
into just another market commodity,” a transformation inconsistent 
with “moral ideals of justice, equality, and community” that would un-
dermine equity and worsen health disparities.  This is a valid concern, 
but I do not think that it means that CDHC is a step backward.  
Somewhat sideways, perhaps, but not backward. 
CDHC will not do much to improve equity.  If it reduces health 
care costs by discouraging unnecessary care, then it could increase ac-
cess by lowering financial barriers to purchasing insurance.  But by 
placing financial and decision-making responsibilities on individual 
enrollees, CDHC is likely to increase the health care access and out-
come disparities associated with enrollees’ differing abilities to handle 
these responsibilities.  Innovations that assist enrollees in meeting 
these responsibilities, such as alterations in CDHC design or the pro-
vision of decision support tools, may reduce disparities, but are 
unlikely to eliminate them. 
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But inequities in health care are not the problem that CDHC is 
designed to address.  Instead, CDHC advocates hope that it will har-
ness the power of markets to efficiently deliver care that reflects enrol-
lees’ preferences.  As Professor Jacobson suggests, market competition 
can achieve some goals but is unlikely to increase health care access.  
To improve equity, CDHC should be layered on top of other kinds of 
policy approaches designed to promote access:  public subsidies for 
the purchase of private insurance, for example, or expanded public 
insurance programs. 
Professor Jacobson advocates adopting some form of universal 
health care, which I agree would do much more to reduce inequities 
than CDHC.  But just as CDHC is a flawed policy innovation that can-
not itself be “the solution to . . . cost, quality, and access concerns,” so 
too is universal health care.  If we more heavily subsidize private in-
surance or adopt a single-payer health care system that covers every-
one, we can improve equity.  However, because inequities and dispari-
ties arise from a variety of factors, not just financial barriers to 
insurance, they will not disappear.  Furthermore, there is little reason 
to believe that a universal health care system would stem increases in 
health care costs, improve health care quality, or be well-tailored to 
meet the needs of those it serves.  Simultaneous achievement of cost, 
quality, and equity goals will depend both on the features of the par-
ticular reforms adopted and on the implementation of complemen-
tary policies designed to achieve these goals. 
In short, I doubt that any single reform will ever be able to achieve 
health care cost, quality, and access goals simultaneously.  In my view, 
then, any innovation that increases the likelihood of achieving at least 
some of them, either in the short term or in the long term, constitutes 
a step forward.  For this reason, I believe that CDHC constitutes a step 
forward despite its flaws. 
There is one other equity-related argument, however, that re-
mains to be addressed.  My opening statement argues that one poten-
tial benefit of CDHC would be to transform attitudes about health 
care.  CDHC would increase the transparency of the link between 
health care choices and their financial consequences.  Because it em-
phasizes the consumer role in health care decision making, it encour-
ages consumers to think more systematically about which aspects of 
care they value and how much they value them, just as they do for 
other goods and services they purchase in the marketplace. 
This transformation is important because it forces us to confront 
the tradeoffs inherent in any health care system in a resource-
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constrained world.  But the CDHC feature with the potential to pro-
duce this transformation, the link between an individual’s decisions 
and the consequences for the individual, could distract enrollees’ at-
tention from the issue that most concerns Professor Jacobson:  equity 
across the population as a whole.  In other words, CDHC-related atti-
tude shifts could start to chip away at individuals’ beliefs that health 
care is different from other goods and services in the marketplace, as 
well as their willingness to support health care policies that reflect 
such beliefs.  If people start to see health care as just another com-
modity, then existing support for public financing of health care, in-
cluding through universal health care systems, may erode. 
I do not believe that this will happen.  Just as people purchase 
food in the marketplace while also supporting government financial 
assistance in ensuring adequate access to food, people purchasing 
health care in the marketplace will support continued government fi-
nancing of care.  Individuals who have adopted more market-oriented 
views may accept more variation in access to care, just as individuals 
accept variations in access to food, a prospect disturbing to those who 
believe that everyone is entitled to exactly the same health care or ex-
actly the same health care choices.  Ultimately, however, I believe that 
regardless of whether CDHC flourishes or falters, public concern 
about equity will persist, as will policies designed to improve it. 
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CLOSING ARGUMENT 
Peter D. Jacobson 
On one level, I completely agree with Professor Madison that our 
different conclusions regarding the desirability of CDHC seem odd 
given our agreement on many of the issues.  With some nuance, I 
even agree with how she characterizes the sources of our disagree-
ment.  For instance, I certainly agree that universal health care would 
not eliminate all disparities or inequities.  There is no magic solution 
that will simultaneously redress all of the health system’s problems.  
To some extent, the policy choice is one of emphasis. 
Yet on another level, these small differences mask more profound 
disagreements and explain why we reach such divergent conclusions.  
Take, for example, Professor Madison’s assertion that CDHC’s flaws 
need not be fatal.  From a design perspective, I certainly agree.  The 
greater problem, though, is conceptual and everything else in our ex-
changes follows from this difference. 
CDHC’s proponents maintain that the health system’s flaws 
emerged because health care is not a market good.  Even assuming 
that a CDHC-based system will achieve efficiency goals more effec-
tively than a government-based system (an unproven assumption given 
differential administrative costs), I think the likely gains are wishful 
thinking.  For reasons I’ll get to in a moment, consumer sovereignty is 
neither desirable nor achievable. 
 
CDHC as a Distraction 
 
In theory, there is certainly no incompatibility between the mar-
ket-driven CDHC components and a governmentally expanded system 
for uninsured populations.  Indeed, one might argue that the two 
should be conjoined in a type of grand bargain across ideological per-
spectives.  For example, I could see an expansion of CDHC through 
changes in federal tax policy combined with some type of health 
stamps (similar to food stamps) that uninsured patients can redeem 
for a minimally acceptable level of health care benefits.  As Haavi 
Morreim has long argued, the real issue is defining the set of mini-
mally accepted health care benefits that should be made available to 
all citizens. 
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But in practice, it is difficult for policymakers to focus on more 
than one idea at a time.  Here, ideological zealotry or purity is likely to 
get in the way.  As we know from the political science literature, policy 
windows of opportunity are fleeting.  Because conservatives are so 
committed to free market solutions and liberals find reliance on the 
market anathema, it will take extraordinary leadership to forge a coa-
lition.  Does anyone see that type of political leadership?  I don’t.  De-
spite the plethora of political rhetoric on reforming the health care 
system, I predict continued political stalemate. 
In the end, my differences with Professor Madison are both prac-
tical and conceptual.  As to the practical, patients are not equivalent 
to physicians.  What underlies CDHC is the notion that patients are 
equipped to make health care decisions as though they were purchas-
ing an automobile.  The pendulum of informed consent has swung so 
far as to minimize the importance of specialized knowledge.  To be 
sure, patient involvement in one’s clinical treatment is essential, espe-
cially where questions of value underlie treatment choices, such as 
with treatments for prostate cancer where outcomes data are indeter-
minate.  But CDHC carries patient responsibility and expectations far 
beyond value choices into areas where even the most informed pa-
tients are likely to be overwhelmed. 
Conceptually, CDHC is a huge distraction from the health care 
system’s core problems.  Because no one disagrees that reducing costs 
and improving quality should be pursued regardless of what the sys-
tem’s dominant organizing principle is, it seems to me that, at best, 
CDHC accelerates desirable initiatives already underway.  Hence, my 
focus is on rectifying the lack of health care access millions of Ameri-
cans face.  If the policy emphasis is on CDHC, it seems inevitable that 
the problems facing uninsured populations will be further marginal-
ized and ignored.  In this sense, a CDHC orientation will crowd out 
policy initiatives designed to mitigate the access problems. 
 
Why It Matters 
 
As Larry Gostin and I argue in LAW AND THE HEALTH SYSTEM 
(Foundation Press, 2005), four conceptual paradigms can be applied 
both to transform and to understand the health care system:  eco-
nomic (the standard competitive model); professional (professional 
self-regulatory norms); rights-based (social justice); and institutional 
(comparative institutional analysis).  As distinct organizing principles, 
these analytical frameworks compete for dominance in shaping how 
the health care enterprise is organized, financed, and delivered.  Each 
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approach will emphasize different sets of norms and ideals, alternative 
policy goals, diverse organizational structures to achieve those goals, 
and divergent legal rules and levels of regulatory oversight. 
We further argued that no one model is inherently superior to 
another, and no one paradigm operates to the exclusion of the oth-
ers.  For the most part, various aspects of each paradigm will be incor-
porated into public policy and legal analyses.  This much I think is 
consistent with Professor Madison’s arguments.  Yet at any given point 
in time, my view is that one model is likely to dominate the policy 
sphere.  Which one of the competing paradigms prevails is a deliber-
ate policy choice, with important patient care implications.  The pol-
icy choice is a function of many factors, including the political zeit-
geist, the feasibility of the chosen alternatives, and determinations of 
which problems seem to be the most pressing and which populations 
are most affected by the changes.  Since the policy responses follow 
from the dominant paradigm, a CDHC-based system will treat access 
disparities very differently than a system based on universal coverage.  
That’s why the policy frame matters so much. 
In practice, we see aspects of each paradigm at work in the cur-
rent health care system.  Although it would be misleading to suggest 
that the policy apparatus ignores any of the four elements, history 
suggests that a dominant frame will emerge.  If the policy focus is on 
CDHC, equity will be subordinated.  If universal coverage dominates, 
CDHC proponents are probably right that cost and quality issues will 
be subordinate.  For me, it’s an easy choice—helping those without 
insurance to have a minimal acceptable level of care.  As suggested 
earlier, the cost and quality concerns are now so embedded that no 
organizing principle will ignore them. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Professor Madison has written an impressive rejoinder to my ar-
guments.  In truth, there is much we agree on, and much to be gained 
from greater market competition in health care.  But there is also 
something to be lost in the process.  And I think that’s why we reach 
such divergent conclusions despite relatively narrow differences.  We 
are so close, and yet so far apart.  Even in a society organized and 
driven by markets and individual responsibility, it is morally unaccept-
able to tolerate the levels of people lacking basic health insurance in 
the United States. 
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